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Abstract
Researchers have questioned whether self-report questionnaires adequately assess post-traumatic growth as it was
theorized (positive personality change after trauma), versus assessing a broader coping mechanism. Across four studies,
we examine whether individuals report post-traumatic growth as a coping mechanism to restore a sense of justice. In
Studies 1 and 2, participants predicted greater post-traumatic growth for a hypothetical victim after a severe accident
that caused grave suffering (and disrupted one’s belief in a just world), compared to an accident that caused minimal
suffering (and did not disrupt one’s belief in a just world). Both perceptions of deservingness of post-traumatic growth
for the victim (a belief in a just world mechanism) and engagement in deliberative rumination (a post-traumatic growth
mechanism) mediated the effect of suffering on the prediction of post-traumatic growth in Study 2. The same pattern of
results held when participants considered their own imagined suffering (Study 3), and when participants reported post-
traumatic growth from distressing events in their own lives (Study 4). As such, we conclude that following an episode of
suffering, either occurring to another or to oneself, self-reports of post-traumatic growth on questionnaires can reflect
two distinct motivations: (1) an attempt to cope with perceived injustices and (2) the will to search for meaning in one’s
suffering.
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Post-traumatic growth (PTG) is defined as positive
personality change that individuals may experience
after they have endured distressing and traumatic
life events (Jayawickreme & Blackie, 2014). PTG
was born out of Janoff-Bulman’s (1992) theory of
shattered assumptions, which argues that traumatic
experiences can severely threaten the assumptions
that individuals implicitly hold about the benevo-
lence, predictability, and meaningfulness of the
world they live in. To recover from trauma, individ-
uals need to rebuild their shattered assumptions to
incorporate their traumatic experience and manage
feelings of fear and acute victimization. Tedeschi
and Calhoun (2004) observed that through this
rebuilding process, some individuals described how
the experience had shaped their identity, relationships
and worldviews in unexpected positive ways. For
example, an individual may rely more on the support
of loved ones when coming to terms with a serious
health diagnosis, and as such may feel closer to and
more able to confide in their loved ones about their
fears and worries. In other words, some people report
positive psychological changes following trauma.
While researchers do not doubt that some individ-
uals experience PTG, they have questioned the suit-
ability and accuracy of assessment tools used to
measure it (Frazier et al., 2009; Jayawickreme &
Blackie, 2014; Tennen & Affleck, 2002). Researchers
have argued that the self-report questionnaires typi-
cally used to measure PTG cannot determine whether
participants’ responses reflect positive changes from
pre-trauma characteristics, versus a broader coping
mechanism to manage the negative emotion triggered
by the trauma. The aim of this paper is to examine the
extent to which perceptions of PTG, following epi-
sodes of suffering, capture one specific coping mech-
anism—the motivation to restore belief in a just world
(BJW; Lerner 1980).
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The accuracy of measurement of post-traumatic
growth
The vast majority of PTG research has relied on
cross-sectional and retrospective study designs.
Typically, in these studies, researchers recruit a
sample of participants who have experienced a trau-
matic life event within a set timeframe, usually three
to five years prior to the study. PTG is then assessed
retrospectively, in reference to that trauma, by asking
participants to complete a self-report questionnaire,
such as the post-traumatic growth inventory (PTGI;
Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996). The PTGI is a 21-item
questionnaire, where participants rate the degree to
which they have experienced each positive change
on the inventory on a 6-point scale from “0” (“did
not experience”) to “5” (“experienced to a very great
degree”). The PTGI measures positive changes in five
domains: Improved relationships (e.g. “I learned a
great deal about how wonderful people are”),
increased feelings of personal strength (e.g. “I discov-
ered that I’m stronger than I thought I was”), deep-
ened spirituality (e.g. “I have a stronger religious
faith”), identification of new possibilities (e.g. “I
have developed new interests”), and appreciation of
life (e.g. “An appreciation for the value of my own
life”). The PTGI is not the only retrospective self-
report questionnaire available to measure PTG (cf.
Joseph et al., 2012; Park et al., 1996), yet it is the
most frequently used. Jayawickreme et al. (2018)
reviewed the published research on PTG between
2016 and 2017 and reported that the PTGI was
used in 94% of publications.
However, despite its frequent use, the PTGI is not
without its problems. For every single item, individu-
als have the error-prone and taxing task of determin-
ing their current standing, recalling their past
standing prior to the trauma, calculating the degree
of change, and determining how much of the change
was uniquely due to the trauma (Coyne & Tennen,
2010; Ford et al., 2008). The few prospective longitu-
dinal studies considering PTG have shown that indi-
viduals are not able to undertake these steps
accurately, thereby calling into question the suitabil-
ity of the PTGI, and other similarly designed retro-
spective self-report questionnaires, for assessing PTG
as positive personality change over time. Specifically,
Frazier et al. (2009) found only a small positive cor-
relation between participants’ responses on the PTGI
(measured once post-trauma) and actual change in
the five domains of PTG. Frazier et al. (2009) mea-
sured actual PTG as the change in scores on the
adapted current-standing PTGI (PTGI-CS) pre- and
post-trauma. This measure of actual change removes
the taxing task of participants calculating the person-
ality change themselves, by producing a difference
score on how people’s stance on the five domains of
PTG has changed between time 1 (pre-trauma) and
time 2 (post-trauma).
Similarly, more recent prospective longitudinal
studies, which also use current-standing measures of
PTG to assess change over time, have found no rela-
tionship between participants’ retrospective percep-
tions of how they had changed and the degree to
which they had actually changed over time (Boals
et al., 2019; Owenz & Fowers, 2018; Yanez et al.,
2011). In other words, research suggests that the
PTGI may not portray an accurate representation
of how much an individual has experienced positive
personality growth following trauma. Although, of
note, Boals et al. (2019) did find that the PTGI-CS
can be adapted to refer to longer time frames (i.e. the
length of an academic semester) and maintain a
strong and positive correlation with the actual
growth.
Post-traumatic growth as a coping mechanism
As highlighted above, the methodological challenges
associated with using a retrospective and cross-
sectional questionnaire to assess PTG makes it diffi-
cult to disentangle whether participants’ responses are
capturing actual positive changes occurring over time,
as theorized, or other plausible alternatives, such as
coping strategies. This has led some researchers to
propose a two-component model of PTG (Zoellner
& Maercker, 2006), where self-reported PTG may
reflect either an illusory belief (i.e. mere perceptions
of PTG) or a constructive and functional belief (i.e.
actual pre- to-post-trauma change) that predicts
greater adjustment over time. The two components
are proposed to have distinct predictors, outcomes
and, importantly, time courses, and research has
offered support for this distinction between illusory
and constructive PTG. Illusory PTG (assessed as
higher scores on the retrospective PTGI), is associat-
ed with increases in distress and avoidance coping
over time, whereas constructive PTG (assessed as
actual pre- to post-trauma change in PTG-related
domains) is associated with decreases in distress
over time (Boals et al., 2019; Frazier et al., 2009).
These findings suggest that the PTGI is not best
suited to measure constructive growth, yet if the
PTGI is measuring illusory growth instead, then ques-
tions remain about the function that self-reports of
illusory growth serve. That is, what motivates individ-
uals to perceive illusory growth following trauma?
Several researchers have proposed that illusory
growth may enable individuals to cope with difficult
and challenging life circumstances. Indeed, there is
conceptual overlap between the content of the PTGI
and self-report questionnaires that assess individual
differences in coping styles and strategies. For exam-
ple, echoing the PTGI, the Brief COPE questionnaire
(Carver, 1997) has a positive reframing sub-domain,
which measures the extent to which individuals are
motivated to search for something positive in their
crisis. Although, PTG and positive reappraisal are
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not necessarily the same construct (and the latter
might be a cognitive mechanism facilitating construc-
tive PTG), the aforementioned issues with the PTGI
make it impossible to fully determine whether peo-
ple’s positive perceptions of their trauma (i.e. illusory
growth) are a coping mechanism, driven in part or
wholly by individual differences in positive
reappraisal.
Another explanation for why individuals may
report illusory PTG is the motivation for self-
enhancement. Specifically, Taylor and colleagues
noted that women undergoing breast cancer treat-
ment would engage in downward social comparisons
and inflate their chances of recovery to feel good
about themselves and optimistic about their future
(Taylor & Armor, 1996; Taylor et al., 2000).
McFarland and Alvaro (2002) found participants
rated themselves significantly lower on growth-
related PTG attributes, when compared to an
acquaintance, prior to the occurrence of the stressful
event. There was no difference in self-ratings and
acquaintance-ratings after the event. These findings
suggest that people may self-enhance to perceive illu-
sory PTG by derogating or misremembering their
past selves. Thus, in self-enhancement explanations
of PTG, these so-called positive illusions are cognitive
distortions, not accurate representations of reality,
which function to protect an individual’s emotional
and psychological health.
In sum, there are separate bodies of work that
could explain retrospective PTGI responses as percep-
tions of illusory growth and as a coping mechanism,
rather than an accurate measure of actual growth.
Post-traumatic growth as a form of ultimate justice
reasoning
Perceiving positivity in trauma and suffering can also
be recognized as ultimate justice reasoning (UJR;
Lerner, 1980). UJR is the perception and prediction
of future positivity and compensation following unde-
served suffering, motivated by the desire to maintain
a belief in a just and fair world. That is, people per-
ceive an individual who has suffered greatly, versus
minimally, as more likely to experience a more fulfill-
ing and meaningful life in the future (Harvey et al.,
2014). UJR offers a potential alternate motivation
and coping mechanism to account for people’s
responses to the PTGI. Yet, despite the theoretical
parallels between UJR and PTG, to our knowledge,
no research has formally examined the extent to
which explanations for PTG can be situated within
just world theory (Lerner, 1980). Therefore, we spe-
cifically set out to examine whether people’s predic-
tions of PTG (Studies 1–3) and people’s self-reported
levels of PTG after distressing events (Study 4), via
the PTGI, are simply one of the mechanisms that
people may adopt when motivated to maintain their
implicit belief that the world is a just and fair place.
To understand UJR, one must first understand the
theoretical construct of the “BJW”. BJW was first
proposed by Lerner (1980), who suggested that
people have a fundamental desire to perceive the
world as a fair and just place, aligned with principles
of deservingness. Adhering to this “fundamental
delusion” allows individuals to pursue long-term
goals and investments with the confidence that just
and deserved rewards will be bestowed. If the world
did not behold such principles, effortful endeavors,
such as working in paid employment, would be con-
sidered fruitless, as there would be no guarantee that
one would receive their deserved outcomes (i.e. pay).
As such, individuals are inherently motivated to per-
ceive all events and outcomes as deserved to pursue
everyday activities, endeavors, and long-term
pursuits.
Although the BJW is fundamental for an individ-
ual to function in modern society, it is ultimately a
delusion. Unfortunately, the reality is that the world
we all live in does not guarantee deserved outcomes.
One does not have to look far to see instances of
injustice, where good, innocent people suffer unde-
served misfortunes. A prominent and recent example
is the great suffering and loss of life of individuals,
including NHS workers, from the deadly Covid-19
Coronavirus. When an individual is faced with such
undeserved suffering, their BJW, and therefore their
faith in the return of their long-term investments, is
threatened (see Callan et al., 2009).
As adhering to principles of deservingness is inte-
gral to daily life and serves important adaptive func-
tions (i.e. investment in long-term goals), individuals
are therefore motivated to restore a sense of justice
when exposed to instances of injustice. Lerner (1980)
argued that people often engage in various cognitive
and behavioral “strategies” or “tactics” to maintain a
perception of justice in the face of instances that pose
a threat to the BJW. Of relevance to the current
paper, Lerner (1980) proposed several “nonrational”
strategies for preserving a commitment to justice that
can involve, among other things, denying, avoiding,
reinterpreting, or misremembering episodes of injus-
tice. Nonrational strategies are typically cognitive dis-
tortions an observer can personally entertain to
maintain their BJW, without seeking any actual
relief or justice for a victim. Thus, such nonrational
strategies to maintain a BJW echo the work on coping
strategies to maintain a positive illusion of PTG, as
both are cognitive distortions to appraise a negative
and irreversible situation in more favorable terms.
UJR is one nonrational strategy people may utilize
as a defence against threats to one’s BJW (Lerner,
1980). To endure and accept the undeserved suffering
of another, one can simply extend the time frame of
an injustice, so that any wrongdoing will be rectified
in the long run and a balance of justice will eventually
be restored. Research has supported theorizing on
UJR and has identified that individuals sometimes
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perceive future benefits and positivity for a victim as a
direct result of their suffering and misfortune
(Anderson et al., 2010; Hafer & Gosse, 2011;
Harvey et al., 2014; Ong et al., 2002; Warner et al.,
2012). For example, Anderson et al. (2010) found that
participants envisioned a teenager’s later life as more
fulfilling and meaningful if he had been badly injured
and placed in a wheelchair (i.e. high BJW threat) than
if he had suffered only a mild injury (i.e. low BJW
threat). This effect was enhanced in their second
experiment, when participants’ just-world beliefs
were first threatened within an unrelated context
(i.e. a prior justice threat “spilled over” to heighten
UJR in another context, Anderson et al., 2010). Most
recently, Ong et al. (2020) found that participants
exposed to individuals who have suffered, versus
not suffered, to be more deserving and therefore per-
ceived them as more likely to receive specific tangible
rewards (i.e. being chosen to receive a green card in
the US “lottery”).
In a similar vein, Harvey and Callan (2014a) found
that participants engage in more UJR when a victim
is portrayed as good and, therefore, undeserving of
misfortune, (versus bad and deserving of misfortune).
Interestingly, UJR appears to work comparatively for
the self as it does for others. Harvey and Callan
(2014a) found that when participants thought about
their own bad breaks, those with higher self-esteem
perceived themselves as more deserving and more
likely to have a fulfilling and meaningful future life
(i.e. UJR) compared to those with lower self-esteem.
More generally, Mata and Sim~ao (2019) found people
make positive and optimistic forecasts for themselves,
regardless of their previous moral conduct.
Therefore, people can engage in the cognitive dis-
tortion of UJR to perceive positive outcomes, in the
form of future compensation, for either an observed
victim or themselves to absolve current suffering and
BJW threat. As such, if people were to respond to the
PTGI following a trauma to predict future positive
psychological growth, their responses could be driven
by the motivation to restore a sense of justice, rather
than the accurate prediction of growth following
shattered and then rebuilt core assumptions (Janoff-
Bulman, 1992). Furthermore, this alternative account
of why individuals perceive PTG is broadly consistent
with Park’s (2010) integrative account of meaning
making in the aftermath of adversity, which posits
that people engage in situational meaning making
processes to reappraise the event and reduce the dis-
crepancy between the occurrence of the adverse event
and their global belief system (i.e. BJW).
The current experiments
In this paper, we aim to test the extent to which a
coping mechanism—the motivation to maintain a
BJW via UJR—accounts for people’s responses to
the PTGI. Despite the theoretical parallels between
UJR and PTG, to our knowledge, no research has
formally examined the extent to which explanations
for PTG can be situated within just world theory
(Lerner, 1980). Combining research on PTG and
BJW, we will examine whether individuals will predict
future psychological growth (i.e. PTG via a predictive
PTGI; Studies 1-3B) and report experiencing PTG
after distressing events in their own lives (Study 4)
as a coping mechanism to restore a sense of justice.
We are interested to see if the effect is mediated by
perceptions of deservingness (Studies 1–4) and/or
processes aligned to PTG (i.e. deliberative rumina-
tion, Cann et al., 2011; Studies 2–4). We are also
interested to examine whether predicting PTG, and
the associated mediational relationships, are constant
across perceptions of others and the self and whether
an individual difference, such as dispositional UJR
(Maes, 1998), moderates the effect (Study 3).
Study 1
Previous research has demonstrated that participants
engage in UJR to a greater extent, and therefore per-
ceive a victim as more likely to have a fulfilling life in
the future, when considering a victim who suffers
greatly (versus minimally; Harvey et al., 2014).
Similarly, we would anticipate that individuals’ pre-
dictions of psychological growth, via the PTGI,
would show the same pattern of results as UJR. In
line with PTG theory, predictions of growth would
only be warranted when an individual’s assumptions
of the world have been shattered through trauma and
suffering (i.e. high BJW threat), rather than mild
inconvenience (i.e. low BJW threat; Janoff-Bulman,
1992). Therefore, we would expect people to predict
greater PTG following instances of observed high suf-
fering than low suffering.
The effect of BJW threat on UJR is mediated and
driven by perceptions of deservingness (Harvey &
Callan, 2014a; Ong et al., 2020). When participants
are confronted with a victim who poses a threat to
their BJW, compared to a victim who poses little to
no threat, participants perceive the victim as more
deserving of future fulfilment in life, which at least
partially accounts for greater engagement with UJR
(Harvey & Callan, 2014a). Therefore, in our first
study we sought to examine if the deservingness
mechanism, which explains UJR in response to suf-
fering, also accounts for predictions of PTG on the
PTGI.
In our first study, we asked participants to read a
hypothetical scenario that outlined a soccer accident
that occurred to someone else. The severity of the
accident was manipulated to either threaten the
notion of a fair and just world (high suffering) or
pose little threat (low suffering). Afterwards, partici-
pants responded to questions that measured UJR and
an adapted version of the PTGI to predict future
PTG. Firstly, we wanted to conceptually replicate
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Harvey and Callan’s (2014a) UJR findings. We
expected to see greater UJR reasoning for partici-
pants in the high suffering condition compared to
the low suffering condition, and for deservingness of
UJR to mediate this effect. Secondly, we wanted to
investigate whether our suffering manipulation led to
greater predictions of PTG in the high versus low
suffering condition and whether this effect was medi-
ated by perceived deservingness of PTG. We pre-
dicted that participants in the high suffering
condition (versus the low suffering condition) would
perceive the victim as more deserving of PTG and
therefore predict greater growth via the PTGI. Our
hypotheses and data analysis plan were preregistered
prior to data collection and are available from the
Open Science Framework (Blackie & Harvey, 2020a).
Methods
All the materials and questionnaires used in each
study are clearly specified in their respective method
section. Furthermore, the data1 and syntax are avail-
able from Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/
dwa3s/
Participants. A total of 303 participants from the UK
were recruited online via Prolific, an online partici-
pant recruitment system, in return for payment of £2.
Our sample size was determined from previous stud-
ies on UJR that had examined similar mediation
hypotheses and the amount of available funds for
the project. A total of 13 participants were excluded
from further data analysis because three participants
did not complete the study, one participant listed
their age as under 18 years, and nine participants
failed the attention check. A final sample consisted
of 290 participants (65% female, 35% male;
Mage¼ 33.81 years; SDage¼ 12.39). This study was
approved by the School Research Ethics Panel at
the first author’s university.
Materials. Vignette: Suffering manipulation.
Participants were exposed to one of two vignettes,
formatted as online blog entries. The vignette
described a young male soccer player called James
who suffered an injury (see Anderson et al., 2010;
Harvey et al., 2014). Participants were randomly
assigned to either the low suffering or the high suffer-
ing vignette. In the low suffering condition (i.e., low
just-world threat), the character in the vignette
sprained his ankle and although this caused an incon-
venience and resulted in him missing a soccer game,
he soon recovered. In the high suffering condition (i.e.
high just-world threat), the character badly injured
his spine and spent much of his teenage years in a
wheelchair before recovering.
Ultimate justice reasoning. UJR was assessed using
three items adapted from Anderson et al. (2010) and
Harvey et al. (2014): “To what extent do you think
James will find his existence fulfilling later in his life
as a result of this accident?” (1¼ “not at all fulfilling”
to 7¼ “very fulfilling”), “To what extent do you think
that in the future, James will experience his life as
meaningful because of this accident?” (1¼ “not at
all meaningful” to 7¼ “very meaningful”) and “To
what extent do you think that in the long run,
James will find purpose in his life as a result of his
accident?” (1¼ “not at all purposeful” to 7¼ “very
purposeful”). These items demonstrated good inter-
nal reliability (a¼ 0.922), so were combined and aver-
aged to create an overall score of Ultimate Justice
Reasoning (UJR; MUJR¼ 3.762; SDUJR¼ 1.620;
n¼ 144 for the low suffering condition and
MUJR¼ 5.454; SDUJR¼ 1.123; n¼ 146 for the high
suffering condition).
Predicted post-traumatic growth (PPTG). The
PTGI (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996) was adapted to
ask participants to rate the extent to which James
(the character in the vignette) will experience positive
changes in his relationships/spirituality/personal
strength/possibilities for life/appreciation of life as a
result of his accident. The original PTGI items were
maintained, but instead of being framed in the past
tense and in the first person (e.g. “I would have a
greater sense of closeness with others”), participants
were asked to predict future growth for the character
from the vignette (e.g., “James will have a greater
sense of closeness with others”). Participants
responded on a 6-point scale from (1¼ “James will
not experience this change as a result of his accident”
to 6¼ “James will experience this change to a very big
degree as a result of his accident”). These items dem-
onstrated good internal reliability (a¼ 0.971), so were
combined and averaged to create an overall score of
PPTG (MPPTG¼ 2.176; SDPPTG¼ 1.020; n¼ 144 for
the low suffering condition and MPPTG¼ 4.029;
SDPPTG¼ 0.780; n¼ 146 for the high suffering
condition).
Deservingness of ultimate justice. Two items taken
from Harvey and Callan (2014a) were used to mea-
sure participants’ judgments of how deserving the
character was of ultimate justice: “I feel that James
deserves to experience his life as meaningful in the
long run” and “I believe James deserves to find pur-
pose and fulfilment later in his life” (1¼ “strongly
disagree” to 7¼ “strongly agree”). These items dem-
onstrated good internal reliability (r¼ 0.815,
p< 0.001), so were combined and averaged to create
an overall score of perceived deservingness of ulti-
mate justice (UJ; MDUJR¼ 5.840; SDDUJR¼ 1.207;
n¼ 144 for the low suffering condition and
MDUJR¼ 6.349; SDDUJR¼ 0.780; n¼ 146 for the
high suffering condition).
Deservingness of PTG. Five items were con-
structed, based on the five domains within the
PTGI (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996), to measure the
extent participants believed the character was deserv-
ing of future growth: “I think James deserves to
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develop stronger relationships with others in the
future”, “I think James deserves to find new possibil-
ities and avenues for his life in the future”, “I think
James deserves to feel stronger and more self-reliant
in himself in the future”, “I think James deserves to
have a better understanding of spiritual matters in the
future”, and “I think James deserves to feel more
appreciative of life in the future” (1¼ “strongly dis-
agree” to 7¼ “strongly agree”). These items demon-
strated good internal reliability (a¼ 0.839), so were
combined and averaged to create an overall
score of deservingness of PTG (MDPTG¼ 5.490;
SDDPTG¼ 1.078; n¼ 144 for the low suffering condi-
tion and MDPTG¼ 5.699; SDDPTG¼ 0.724; n¼ 146
for the high suffering condition).
Manipulation and attention check. Three items
from previous research (e.g. Harvey et al., 2014)
were utilized to measure suffering and unfairness
and validate our manipulation of BJW: “In your
opinion after reading the blog, how much do you
believe James suffered from his accident?”
(1¼ “hardly suffered at all” to 7¼ “suffered a great
deal”), “I feel what happened to James is:”
(1¼ “slightly unfair” to 7¼ “a great deal unfair”),
and “To what extent do you feel that this accident
was a just and fair outcome for James?” (1¼ “not at
all just and fair” to 6¼ “very just and fair”; reverse
coded). These items demonstrated good internal reli-
ability (a ¼ 0.751), so were combined and averaged to
create an overall score of perceived unfairness
(MPU¼ 3.174; SDPU¼ 0.991; n¼ 144 for the low suf-
fering condition and MPU¼ 5.731; SDPU¼ 0.885;
n¼ 146 for the high suffering condition).
One item was included as an attention check item.
Participants were asked “What injuries, if any, did
James suffer in his soccer accident?” and given the
following options: “Broken leg and damage to his
spine” (correct for the high suffering condition),
“Mild sprain to his ankle” (correct for the low suffer-
ing condition), “No injuries” and “I can’t remember”.
A total of nine participants failed this attention check,
as mentioned in the participant subsection above.
Procedure. Participants were recruited to participate in
an online survey on perceptions of people and per-
sonal experiences. The survey was conducted via
Qualtrics. Participants were presented with a partici-
pant information sheet and provided informed con-
sent before participating in the study.
Participants first read a vignette formatted as an
online blog entry describing a soccer accident involv-
ing a character named James. Participants were ran-
domly allocated to either the high suffering condition,
where James spent time in a wheelchair, or the low
suffering condition, where James suffered a mild
sprain. Next, participants answered a series of ques-
tions about the vignette. Participants answered the
UJR items and the adapted PTGI to measure
PPTG. These scales were counterbalanced so half of
the participants responded to the UJR items first and
the other half of participants responded to the
adapted PTGI first. Participants then answered the
deservingness of ultimate justice items, followed by
the deservingness of PTG items, followed by the
manipulation check items, the attention check item
and demographic questions. Finally, participants
were debriefed and paid £2, via the recruiting plat-
form Prolific, for their participation.
Results
The reported data analyses follow our preregistered
data analytic plan. The data, correlation matrices,
and syntax files are available from the project page
on the Open Science Framework.
Manipulation check: Perceived unfairness. As specified in
our pre-registration, outliers were determined as
extreme values that were more than 3 SD from
the mean in each condition. Two outliers for per-
ceived unfairness were therefore removed from the
high suffering condition for being more than 3 SD
below the condition mean. The distribution of the
data was skewed in both conditions (low
suffering¼W(144)¼ 0.98, p¼ 0.046 and high
suffering¼W(144)¼ 0.90, p< 0.001), therefore a
nonparametric test was conducted. A Mann–
Whitney test validated our manipulation by demon-
strating that participants in the high suffering condi-
tion (Mdn¼ 6.00, SD¼ 0.83, Mean ranks¼ 212.77)
perceived the accident as significantly more unfair
than participants in the low suffering condition
(Mdn¼ 3.33, SD¼ 0.99, Mean ranks¼ 78.23),
U¼ 537.00, Z¼13.95, p< 0.001, ƞ2¼ 0.68.
Ultimate justice reasoning. Three outliers for UJR were
removed from the high suffering condition for being
more than 3 SD below the condition mean. The UJR
measure violated assumptions of normality in both
the low suffering (W(144)¼ 0.96, p< 0.001) and
high suffering (W(143)¼ 0.96, p< 0.001) conditions
and the assumption of equal variances was violated
(F(1, 285)¼ 26.274, p< 0.001), therefore a nonpara-
metric test was conducted. A Mann–Whitney test
demonstrated that participants in the high suffering
condition (Mdn¼ 5.33, SD¼ 1.01, Mean ranks¼
190.03) perceived greater UJR for the victim of the
accident than participants in the low suffering condi-
tion (Mdn¼ 4.00, SD¼ 1.62, Mean ranks¼ 98.29),
U¼ 3714.00, Z¼9.39, p< 0.001, ƞ2¼ 0.31.
UJR mediation. Based on hypotheses from past
research on UJR (Harvey & Callan, 2014a), the
assumed temporal sequence of the mediation model
tested in this study is that highly threatening negative
life events (i.e. event severity: the manipulated X var-
iable) encourage people to reflect on their deserving-
ness of compensation (i.e. mediator), which in turn
leads to engagement in UJR (i.e. Y variable). Before
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examining whether perceived deservingness of ulti-
mate justice mediated the relationship between condi-
tion and UJR, we examined whether the data met the
assumptions required for regression. No issues with
normality (as assessed by examining the plot of resid-
uals), heteroscedasticity or multicollinearity were
identified (Tolerance< 1, IVF< 2). We examined
the data for outliers using Mahalanobis distance,
cooks distance, and leverage statistics and utilized a
conservative strategy where participants were exclud-
ed only if they exceeded the cut-off score for two of
the outlier statistics. No participants were excluded
following these criteria.
We conducted mediation analyses using the
PROCESS macro via SPSS (Hayes, 2017; Model 4,
10,000 resamples).2 The indirect pathway between
suffering condition and UJR, via perceived deserving-
ness of UJ, was significant (indirect effect, b ¼ 0.19,
95% BCa CI [0.09, 0.33]; see Figure 1). That is, per-
ceived deservingness of ultimate justice at least partly
explains why participants perceive greater UJR for a
victim who suffers greatly versus minimally.
Predicted post-traumatic growth. One outlier from the
low suffering condition was removed for being more
than 3 SDs above the condition mean. The measure
of PPTG violated assumptions of normality, with
positively skewed data in the low suffering condition,
W(143)¼ 0.91, p< 0.001. In addition, Levene’s test
for equality of variances was significant, F(1, 287)¼
10.96, p< 0.001, so a nonparametric test was con-
ducted. A Mann–Whitney test demonstrated that par-
ticipants in the high suffering condition (Mdn¼ 4.07,
SD¼ 0.78, Mean ranks¼ 204.58) predicted greater
PTG for the victim of the accident than participants
in the low suffering condition (Mdn¼ 1.86,
SD¼ 0.98, Mean ranks¼ 84.17), U¼ 1740.00,
Z¼12.25, p< .001, ƞ2¼ 0.52.
PPTG mediation. Based on hypotheses from
research on UJR and PTG theory (Harvey &
Callan, 2014a; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004), the
assumed temporal sequence of the mediation model
tested in this analysis is that highly threatening nega-
tive life events (i.e. event severity: the manipulated X
variable) encourage people to reflect on their deserv-
ingness of PTG (i.e. mediator), which in turn leads to
perceptions of PTG (i.e. Y).
Before examining whether perceived deservingness
of PTG mediated the relationship between suffering
condition and PPTG, we examined whether the data
met the assumptions required for regression. No
issues with normality (as assessed by examining the
plot of residuals), heteroscedasticity or multicollinear-
ity were identified (Tolerance< 1, IVF< 2). No out-
liers were identified as exceeding the cut-off threshold
for two or more of the outlier statistics for
Mahalanobis distance, cooks distance, and leverage
outlier statistics.
We conducted mediation analyses using the
PROCESS macro via SPSS (Hayes, 2017; Model 4,
10,000 resamples). The indirect pathway between suf-
fering condition and PPTG, via perceived deserving-
ness of PTG, was not significant (indirect effect , b
¼ 0.06, 95% BCa CI [0.001, 0.13]; see Figure 2).
Therefore, perceived deservingness of PTG did not
mediate the relationship between suffering condition
and PPTG.
Discussion
Our findings from Study 1 conceptually replicated
previous UJR research (e.g. Harvey & Callan,
2014a) in that participants engaged with greater
UJR when exposed to a victim who had suffered
greatly, versus minimally, and perceptions of deserv-
ing ultimate justice mediated this relationship. In
other words, a high suffering victim poses a greater
threat to participants’ BJW than a victim who is not
suffering, presumably due to such suffering being
unfair and undeserved. In an attempt to annul this
threat, participants perceived the high threat victim as
deserving of and therefore likely to receive future
compensation and positivity in the form of a future
fulfilling and meaningful life.
As expected, the suffering manipulation impacted
participants perceived PTG for the victim.
Participants expected the high suffering victim to
have greater positive psychological growth than the
low suffering victim. This effect would be expected
Figure 1. Mediational model from Study 1, predicting ultimate justice reasoning from suffering condition and perceived deserv-
ingness of ultimate justice.
Values show unstandardized path coefficients due to the inclusion of a dichotomous condition variable (cf. Hayes, 2017), ***p< 0.001.
The indirect effect is not associated with a p-value (see Hayes, 2017).
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from the PTG literature, because for growth to occur,
one’s assumptions of the world must first be shattered
through trauma and suffering (Janoff-Bulman, 1992),
which we would expect to occur for an individual
placed in a wheelchair (i.e. high suffering condition)
compared to an individual experiencing a mild incon-
venience (i.e. low suffering condition). We were par-
ticularly interested here however, to see if principles
of deservingness mediated the relationship between
suffering condition and PPTG, as they do for UJR.
However, the indirect pathway was not significant,
suggesting participants did not predict future PTG
following suffering because positive psychological
growth was perceived as deserved. This finding sug-
gests that PPTG is not driven by principles of deserv-
ingness and is not a coping mechanism to overcome a
threat to one’s BJW.
Study 2
Although Study 1 identified that participants expect
someone who has experienced grave suffering to grow
positively in the future, this expectation of growth
was not explained by BJW principles of perceived
victim deservingness. In our second study, we
sought to further explore the mechanism that
accounts for the effect of suffering on PPTG and
determine if the mechanism underlying PPTG was
one aligned with PTG theory, rather than one aligned
with BJW.
PTG is theorized to occur through two fundamen-
tal cognitive mechanisms: (1) the initial trauma must
shatter an individual’s assumptions of the world and
(2) meaning-making processes are initiated to consid-
er the trauma and its implications (Cann et al., 2011;
Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Once someone’s world
assumptions are shattered, they need to rebuild their
framework and core beliefs about the world, which
gives individuals the space and opportunity to posi-
tively change and grow (Cann et al., 2011). To rebuild
their world, Cann et al. (2011) proposes that survivors
of trauma may engage in deliberative ruminative
thought, which is defined as intentional and voluntary
thinking, “focused purposefully on trying to under-
stand events and their implications” (p. 138).
Thus, in Study 2, we replicated Study 1, but
removed measurement of UJR and included Cann
et al.’s (2011) measure of deliberative rumination as
a second and alternative mediator. The aim of Study
2 was therefore to test two competing mechanisms
(i.e. deservingness and deliberative rumination) from
alternative theories in an effort to account for the
effect of suffering on PPTG. Our method and data
analysis plan was preregistered prior to data collec-
tion and is available from the Open Science
Framework (Blackie & Harvey, 2020b).
Methods
Participants. A total of 310 participants from the UK
were recruited online via Prolific, in return for pay-
ment of £2. Our sample size was determined from
previous studies on UJR that had examined similar
mediation hypotheses and available funds for the
project. Participants who had participated in Study
1 were prevented from participating in this study to
ensure participants were blind to hypotheses. A total
of 26 participants were excluded from data analysis
based on criteria in our preregistered data analytic
plan; 8 participants did not answer any questions,
2 participants listed their age as under 18 years, and
16 participants failed the attention check question.
A final sample consisted of 284 participants (70%
female, 29% male, 1% nonbinary; aged 18–68 years
Mage¼ 33.64 years; SDage¼ 11.82). The School
Research Ethics Committee at the second author’s
university approved the study.
Materials. Vignette: Suffering manipulation. As in
Study 1, participants were exposed to one of two
vignettes, formatted as online blog entries. We used
the same vignettes as in Study 1, which described a
young male soccer player who suffered an injury
(Anderson et al., 2010, Harvey et al., 2014).
Participants were randomly assigned to either the
low suffering condition, in which the character
James had sprained his ankle (low just-world
threat), or the high suffering condition, in which the
Figure 2. Mediational model from Study 1, predicting predicted post-traumatic growth (from the adapted PTGI) from suffering
condition and perceived deservingness of post-traumatic growth.
Values show unstandardized path coefficients, ***p< 0.001. The indirect effect is not associated with a p-value (see Hayes, 2017).
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character had badly injured his spine (high just-world
threat).
Predicted post-traumatic growth. We used the
adapted PTGI (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996) from
Study 1, which asked participants to predict the
extent to which the character in the vignette will expe-
rience positive changes in his future relationships/
spirituality/personal strength/possibilities for life/
appreciation of life as a result of his accident. These
items demonstrated good internal reliability
(a¼ 0.971), so were averaged to create an overall
score of PPTG (MPPTG¼ 2.374; SDPPTG¼ 1.114;
n¼ 141 for the low suffering condition and
MPPTG¼ 4.014; SDPPTG¼ 0.786; n¼ 143 for the
high suffering condition).
Deservingness of PTG. We used the same five items
from Study 1 to measure the extent to which partic-
ipants believed the character in the vignette was
deserving of positive changes in his relationships/spir-
ituality/personal strength/possibilities for life/appreci-
ation of life as a result of his accident. These items
demonstrated good internal reliability (a ¼ 0.845), so
were averaged to create an overall score of deserving-
ness of PTG (MDPTG¼ 4.630; SDDPTG¼ 0.939;
n¼ 141 for the low suffering condition and
MDPTG¼ 5.587; SDDPTG¼ 0.751; n¼ 143 for the
high suffering condition).
Deliberative rumination. The deliberative rumina-
tion subdomain of the Event Related Rumination
Inventory (Cann et al., 2011) was adapted to ask par-
ticipants to predict the extent to which the character
of the vignette would engage in intentional meaning-
making in the few weeks immediately following his
accident. The original 10-items were maintained, but
instead of being framed in the past tense and the first
person (e.g. “I thought about whether I could find
meaning from my experience”), participants were
asked to predict the extent to which James would
engage in such thought processes in the weeks imme-
diately after his accident (e.g. “James will think about
whether he can find meaning from his accident”).
Participants responded on a 4-point scale from “1”
(“not at all”) to “4” (“often”). These items demon-
strated good internal reliability (a¼ 0.909), so were
averaged to create an overall score of rumination
(MRUM¼ 2.102; SDRUM¼ 0.711; n¼ 141 for the low
suffering condition and MRUM¼ 3.01; SDRUM¼
0.456; n¼ 143 for the high suffering condition).
Manipulation and attention check. We used the
same three items from Study 1 to measure suffering
and unfairness. However, in this study, we adjusted
the rating scale for the following item to ensure all
three items were rated on a 7-point scale: “To what
extent do you feel that this accident was a just and fair
outcome for James?” (1¼ “not at all just and fair” to
7¼ “very just and fair”; reverse coded). These items
demonstrated good internal reliability (a¼ 0.765), so
were averaged to create an overall score of perceived
unfairness (MPU¼ 3.541; SDPU¼ 1.148; n¼ 141 for
the low suffering condition and MPU¼ 5.909;
SDPU¼ 0.893; n¼ 143 for the high suffering condi-
tion). We used the same attention check question
from Study 1, in which participants had to say what
injuries the character in the vignette had suffered in
his soccer accident (i.e. broken leg and spinal damage/
mild sprain to his ankle/no injuries/I can’t remember).
As outlined in the participant section, 16 participants
failed this attention check question and were excluded
from data analysis.
Procedure
Participants responded to an advertisement posted on
Prolific to participate in an online survey about per-
ceptions of people and personal experiences. The
survey was conducted via Qualtrics. Participants
were presented with a participant information sheet
and provided informed consent before participating
in the study.
Participants first read a vignette formatted as a
blog entry describing a soccer accident and were ran-
domly allocated to either the high suffering or the low
suffering condition. Next, participants responded to
the adapted PTGI (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996) fol-
lowed by the adapted deliberative rumination scale
(Cann et al., 2011) and deservingness of PTG scale.
The presentation order of the two latter scales was
counterbalanced, such that half of the participants
responded to the deservingness of PTG items first
and the other half of participants responded to the
deliberative rumination items first. Participants then
answered the manipulation check and attention check
questions, followed by demographic questions about
their age and gender. Participants were debriefed and
paid £2 for their participation.
Results
The reported data analyses follow our preregistered
data analytic plan. The data, correlation matrices,
and syntax files are available from the project page
on the Open Science Framework.
Manipulation check: Perceived unfairness. No outliers
(extreme values 3 SD from the mean in each condi-
tion) were detected for the variable of perceived
unfairness. However, this variable was negatively
skewed in the high suffering condition W(143)¼
0.93, p< 0.001 and Levene’s test for equality of var-
iances was significant, F(1, 282)¼ 6.69, p¼ 0.01. For
these reasons, a nonparametric test was conducted. A
Mann–Whitney test validated our manipulation by
demonstrating that participants in the high suffering
condition (Mdn¼ 6.00, SD¼ 0.89, Mean ranks¼
205.05) perceived the accident as significantly more
unfair than participants in the low suffering condition
(Mdn¼ 3.33, SD¼ 1.14, Mean ranks¼ 79.06),
U¼ 1137.00, Z¼12.96, p< 0.001, ƞ2¼ 0.60.
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Predicted post-traumatic growth. One outlier in the low
suffering condition was excluded for being more than
3 SD above the condition mean. The PPTG variable
was positively skewed in the low suffering condition
W(140)¼ 0.90, p< 0.001 and Levene’s test for equal-
ity of variances was significant, F(1, 281)¼ 11.15,
p¼ .001. Therefore, a nonparametric test was con-
ducted. A Mann–Whitney test demonstrated that par-
ticipants in the high suffering condition (Mdn¼ 4.05,
SD¼ 0.79, Mean ranks¼ 195.28) predicted greater
PTG for the victim of the accident than participants
in the low suffering condition (Mdn¼ 2.00,
SD¼ 1.08, Mean ranks¼ 87.58), U¼ 2390.50,
Z¼11.07, p< 0.001, ƞ2¼ 0.43.
Mediation analysis. Based on hypotheses derived from
PTG and BJW theory (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004;
Lerner, 1980), the assumed temporal sequence of
the mediation model tested in this study is that
highly threatening negative events (i.e. event severity:
the manipulated X variable) encourage people to
reflect on their deservingness of compensation and
the meaning/impact of the event (i.e. two mediators
of perceptions of deservingness and deliberative rumi-
nation), which in turn facilitates perceptions of PTG
(i.e. Y). This temporal sequence is assumed in all fur-
ther studies where mediation is tested with these var-
iables (i.e. Studies 3B and 4).
Before examining whether perceived deservingness
of PTG and the likelihood of engaging in intentional
meaning making (i.e. deliberative rumination) medi-
ated the relationship between suffering condition and
PPTG, we examined whether the data met the
assumptions required for regression. No issues with
normality (as assessed by examining the plot of resid-
uals), heteroscedasticity or multicollinearity were
identified (Tolerance< 1, IVF< 2). We examined
the data for outliers using Mahalanobis distance,
cooks distance and leverage statistics and utilized a
conservative strategy where participants were
excluded only if they exceeded the cut-off score for
two of the outlier statistics. Based on this criteria, six
participants were excluded prior to subsequent data
analysis for exceeding cut-off scores for cooks dis-
tance and leverage statistics.
We conducted mediation analyses using the
PROCESS macro via SPSS (Hayes, 2017; Model 4,
10,000 resamples). We regressed condition (X),
deservingness of PTG (M1) and deliberative rumina-
tion (M2) onto PPTG (Y). The indirect pathway
between suffering condition and PTG, via perceived
deservingness of PTG, was significant (indirect effect,
b¼ 0.37, 95% BCa CI [0.23, 0.52]) and the indirect
pathway between suffering condition and PTG, via
deliberative rumination, was significant (indirect
effect, b ¼ 0.52, 95% BCa CI [0.33, 0.73]; see Figure
3). A pairwise contrast between the two mediators did
not differ from 0 (indirect effect, b¼0.15, 95% BCa
CI [0.43, 0.13]), suggesting that the indirect path-
ways for each mediator are not significantly different
from one another. In other words, both perceived
deservingness and deliberative rumination equally
contribute to mediating the effect of suffering condi-
tion on PPTG.
Discussion
The direct effect of suffering condition on PPTG
found in Study 1 was replicated in Study 2.
Participants who were exposed to a high suffering
victim predicted greater future PTG for the victim
compared to participants presented with an individu-
al who suffered minimally. In Study 2 we sought to
better understand the mechanism accounting for this
effect, by considering both a coping mechanism
explanation from the BJW literature (i.e. deserving-
ness) and a PTG mechanism of deliberative rumina-
tion (see Cann et al., 2011). The findings from Study 2
suggest both mechanisms equally account for the
effect of suffering condition on PPTG. That is, par-
ticipants predict future PTG partially because future
Figure 3. Mediational model from Study 2, predicting perceived predicted post-traumatic growth from suffering condition, perceived
deservingness of post-traumatic growth and intentional meaning-making (from deliberative rumination).
Values show unstandardized path coefficients, ***p< 0.001. The indirect effect is not associated with a p-value (see Hayes, 2017).
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positivity is what someone who has suffered deserves,
and partially because participants expect a sufferer to
intentionally ruminate on their suffering to find
meaning and grow from the experience.
However, despite the similar design, we did not
find evidence of deservingness of PTG mediating
the relationship between suffering condition and
PPTG in Study 1. The only notable difference in the
design of these two studies is that Study 1 included
two measures of UJR (UJR items from previous
research and PPTG via the adapted PTGI) and mea-
sured both deservingness of UJR and deservingness
of PTG. Although the presentation order of UJR and
PTG was counterbalanced in Study 1, all participants
completed the deservingness of UJR items before the
deservingness of PTG items. It is therefore possible
that because participants had responded to the PPTG
items, the UJR items and the deservingness of UJR
items, the threat posed to their BJW after reading
about the high suffering victim was annulled, and fur-
ther engagement in the deservingness of PTG items
was redundant. We discuss this possibility further in
the general discussion. Given this inconsistent find-
ing, we measured these two mechanisms again in
Study 3B to determine if we could conceptually rep-
licate the parallel mediation when, as in Study 2, UJR
was conceptualized and measured only as PPTG.
Study 3A
Studies 1 and 2 required participants to predict the
extent to which another person was likely to experi-
ence PTG after an accident via a hypothetical
vignette. This methodology is commonly used in
just world research (e.g. Harvey et al., 2014), but in
PTG research, participants report their own experien-
ces of PTG after a distressing life event. Thus, we
aimed to investigate whether perceived deservingness
and deliberative rumination continue to explain the
effect of suffering on PPTG when participants predict
their own PTG from minor versus life-altering
accidents.
We created new vignettes for Study 3A, which we
intended to be more inclusive and easier for partici-
pants to imagine happening in their own lives than
the vignettes used in Studies 1 and 2. The aim of this
pilot study was therefore to determine whether the
newly created vignettes had the desired condition
effects. We examined whether we had successfully
manipulated suffering by determining whether partic-
ipants in the high suffering condition rated their
imagined accident as more unfair and more likely to
result in PPTG than participants in the low suffering
condition. Our hypotheses and data analysis plan
were preregistered prior to data collection and are
available from the Open Science Framework
(Blackie & Harvey, 2020c).
Methods
Participants. A total of 112 participants from the UK
were recruited online via Prolific in return for pay-
ment of £0.50. Our sample size was determined by an
a priori power calculation that determined we would
need a minimum of 82 participants based on an effect
size derived from Studies 1 and 2 of d¼ 1.7 and power
at 95%. Participants who had participated in Study 1
or Study 2 were prevented from participating. A total
of seven participants were excluded from data analy-
sis because one participant listed their age as under 18
years and six participants did not answer any ques-
tions. A final sample consisted of 105 participants
(51% female, 46% male, 3% did not provide demo-
graphic information; aged 18–21 years Mage¼ 18.04
years; SDage¼ 0.31). The School Research Ethics
Committee at the second author’s university
approved the study.
Materials. Vignette: Suffering manipulation. We
adapted the hypothetical scenarios used in Studies 1
and 2. The vignettes required participants to imagine
that they had sustained an injury while out running.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the low
suffering or the high suffering vignette. In the low
suffering condition (low just-world threat), partici-
pants imagined that they had tripped and sprained
their ankle and although this was an inconvenience,
they soon recovered. In the high suffering condition
(high just-world threat), participants imagined that
they had tripped, broken their ankle, injured their
spine and had to undergo multiple surgeries and phys-
iotherapy before recovering.
Manipulation checks. Participants answered the
three manipulation check items on perceived unfair-
ness (a ¼ 0.668; MPU¼ 1.168; SDPU¼ 1.168; n¼ 53
for the low suffering condition and MPU¼ 5.096;
SDPU¼ 0.934; n¼ 52 for the high suffering condi-
tion)3 and the predictive PTGI (Tedeschi &
Calhoun, 1996; a¼ 0.947; MPPTG¼ 2.474;
SDPPTG¼ 1.000; n¼ 52 for the low suffering condi-
tion and MPPTG¼ 3.554; SDPPTG¼ 0.826; n¼ 50 for
the high suffering condition) from Studies 1 and 2.
The PTGI measure was adapted to refer to the self
in the imagined vignette, rather than a hypothetical
other. One question on how easy participants found it
to imagine the accident happening in their own lives
on a scale from 1 (“not at all easy”) to 5 (“very easy”)
was also included (MEASE¼ 4.250; SDEASE¼ 0.789;
n¼ 52 for the low suffering condition and
MEASE¼ 3.540; SDEASE¼ 1.073; n¼ 50 for the high
suffering condition), along with some demographic
questions.
Procedure. Participants responded to an advertisement
posted on Prolific to participate in an online survey
about perceptions of people and personal experiences.
The survey was conducted via Qualtrics. Participants
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were presented with a participant information sheet
and provided informed consent before participating
in the study.
Participants were first randomly assigned to read
one of the vignettes, which asked them to imagine
they had sustained a minor or severe injury while
running outside for exercise. Afterwards, participants
answered questions about the unfairness of the acci-
dent and the likelihood of experiencing PTG as a
result of the accident, assuming that the accident
had happened in their own lives. Finally, participants
answered one question on how easy they found it to
imagine the accident had happened in their life and
provided their age and gender. Participants were
debriefed and paid £0.50 for their participation.
Results
The reported data analyses follow our preregistered
data analytic plan. The data, correlation matrices,
and syntax files are available from the project page
on the Open Science Framework.
Unfairness. We first examined whether participants’
perceptions of unfairness differed between the condi-
tions. No outliers were detected for the variable of
perceived unfairness. However, this variable was pos-
itively skewed in the high suffering condition, W
(52)¼ 0.95, p¼ 0.019. We therefore conducted a non-
parametric test. A Mann–Whitney test validated our
manipulation by demonstrating that participants in
the high suffering condition (Mdn¼ 5.00, SD¼ 0.93,
Mean ranks¼ 70.94) perceived the accident as signif-
icantly more unfair than participants in the low suf-
fering condition (Mdn¼ 3.67, SD¼ 1.17, Mean
ranks¼ 35.40), U¼ 445.00, Z¼6.00, p< 0.001,
ƞ2¼ 0.35.
Predicted post-traumatic growth. We next examined
whether participants’ predictions of PTG as a result
of the accident differed between conditions. Although
there were no outliers identified, this variable was
positively skewed in the low suffering condition, W
(52)¼ 0.89, p< 0.001. We therefore conducted a non-
parametric test. A Mann–Whitney test validated our
manipulation by demonstrating that participants in
the high suffering condition (Mdn¼ 3.57, SD¼ 0.83,
Mean ranks¼ 66.64) predicted they would experience
greater PTG than participants in the low suffering
condition (Mdn¼ 2.10, SD¼ 1.00, Mean
ranks¼ 36.94), U¼ 543.00, Z¼5.07, p< 0.001,
ƞ2¼ 0.25.
Ease of imagining. Finally, we examined the frequencies
of participants’ responses to the question about how
easy they found it to imagine that the accident had
happened in their own lives. Most participants found
the accidents described in the hypothetical scenarios
fairly easy to imagine happening to them with 72% of
the sample endorsing a “4” or “5” on the scale
(Mean¼ 3.90, SD¼ 1.00, Mode¼ 4.00). We under-
took some further analyses (not specified in our pre-
registration) to determine if ease of imagination was
equivalent across conditions. For each condition, we
ran a one-sample t-test against a test score of 3 (i.e.
scale mid-point). In both conditions, the mean of ease
of imagination was significantly greater than 3, indi-
cating that both conditions found the hypothetical
scenarios easy to imagining happening to them (i.e.
low suffering; Mease¼ 4.250, SDease¼ 0.789, t(51)¼
11.424, p< 0.001 and high suffering; Mease¼ 3.540,
SDease¼ 1.073, t(49)¼ 3.558, p¼ 0.001).
Discussion
Based on these results, we can conclude that we suc-
cessfully manipulated just world threat in regard to
one’s own suffering across the two conditions.
Participants found the accidents described in the
vignettes easy to imagine happening to them and,
we observed parallel findings to those in Study 1
and Study 2, with participants in the high just world
threat condition (high suffering) perceiving their acci-
dent to be more unfair and predicting greater PTG
than participants in the low just world threat condi-
tion (low suffering).
Study 3B
Previous research within the BJW literature demon-
strates that participants engage in UJR comparably if
they are responding to the injustice of another or con-
templating their own injustices (Harvey & Callan,
2014a). However, research within the PTG literature
is focused largely on the examination of self-ratings of
PTG. Individuals are usually only asked to rate the
PTG of a close friend or family member in an effort
to corroborate and validate the veracity of self-
reports of PTG (Blackie et al., 2015). Therefore,
Study 3B considered if the findings from Study 2
could be conceptually replicated when participants
made predictions of PTG about their own misfortune,
rather than that of another.
In addition, we wanted to explore if some individ-
uals were more likely to perceive themselves as
deserving of PTG if they held dispositional views
about ultimate justice. Lerner (1980) first proposed
“ultimate justice” as a belief system that can account
for temporary setbacks in life due to the assumption
that things will work out in the long run. Maes (1998)
developed a 4-item “belief in ultimate justice” (BUJ)
scale to measure a dispositional belief in ultimate jus-
tice (e.g. “Even persons who suffer from severe mis-
fortune can expect that, in the end, something good
will happen to balance everything out”). Maes (1998)
found the BUJ scale to correlate significantly and
positively with the ability to find meaning and the
expectation of a cure of cancer being found in the
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near future. Maes (1998) also identified a positive
correlation between BUJ and people’s confidence in
coping with cancer (should they be diagnosed).
Therefore, BUJ appears to be an individual difference
trait associated with adaptive processes when con-
fronted with suffering and injustice. Someone with a
high endorsement of BUJ assumes that a state of
equilibrium and justice is obtained in the long run,
and therefore reinterprets instances of suffering and
misfortune with optimism. As such, we predict that
this individual difference may moderate the extent to
which participants believe they are deserving of future
growth following suffering.
In sum, we predicted that Study 3B would concep-
tually replicate the findings from Study 2, in that
participants in the high suffering condition would
perceive greater PPTG for themselves compared to
participants in the low suffering condition. Due to
this prediction of PTG being motivated by both a
coping mechanism to restore a sense of justice and a
product of making sense of and rebuilding shattered
assumptions, as found in Study 2, both perceived
deservingness of PTG and deliberative rumination
should mediate this relationship. Finally, we seek to
explore if individual differences in the BUJ moderate
the mediation of condition on PPTG via perceived
deservingness. Our hypotheses and data analysis
plan were preregistered prior to data collection and
are available from the Open Science Framework
(Blackie & Harvey, 2020c).
Methods
Participants. A total of 301 participants from the UK
were recruited online via Prolific, in return for pay-
ment of £2. Our sample size was determined from
previous studies on UJR that had examined similar
mediation hypotheses and available funds for the
project. Participants who had participated in Study
1, 2, or 3A were prevented from participating in this
study to ensure participants were blind to hypotheses.
A total of 19 participants were excluded from data
analysis based on criteria in our preregistered data
analytic plan for failing the attention check question.
A final sample consisted of 282 participants (65%
female, 34% male, 0.4% nonbinary, 0.4% preferred
not to state; aged 18–74 years Mage¼ 35.05 years;
SDage¼ 12.47). The study received ethical approval
from the School Research Ethics Committee at the
first author’s university.
Materials. Vignette: Suffering manipulation. We uti-
lized the vignettes pre-tested in Study 3A.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the
low suffering or the high suffering vignette.
Belief in ultimate justice. We utilized the 4-item dis-
positional BUJ scale from Maes (1998) to measure
participant’s belief that suffering is ultimately com-
pensated in the long-run with positive outcomes.
For example, the scale measures participants’ agree-
ment to items such as: “Even persons who suffer from
severe misfortune can expect that, in the end, some-
thing good will happen to balance everything out”.
The items was scored on a 6-point scale ranging from
1 (“do not agree at all”) to 6 (“agree very strongly”).
The scale demonstrated acceptable internal consisten-
cy (a¼ 0.866), so the 4 items were averaged to create
an overall measure of BUJ (MBUJ¼ 3.399;
SDBUJ¼ 1.122; n¼ 282).
Predicted post-traumatic growth. We used the
PTGI (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996) to ask participants
to what degree they believed they would experience
relevant changes in response to the scenario they had
previously read. The original 21 PTGI items were
adapted with the stem “I would. . .” to refer to the
future tense, and participants rated the items on a
six point scale (from 1¼ “I would not experience
this change as a result of my accident” to 6¼ “I
would experience this change to a very big degree as
a result of my accident”). These items demonstrated
good internal reliability (a¼ 0.971), so were averaged
to create an overall score of PPTG (MPPTG¼ 2.359;
SDPPTG¼ 1.092; n¼ 144 for the low suffering condi-
tion and MPPTG¼ 3.702; SDPPTG¼ 0.979; n¼ 138 for
the high suffering condition).
Deservingness of PTG. We adapted the five deserv-
ingness items from Studies 1 and 2 to refer to partic-
ipants directly (e.g. “I believe I deserve to develop
stronger relationships in the future”). These items
demonstrated good internal reliability (a¼ 0.859), so
were averaged to create an overall score of deserving-
ness of PTG (MDPTG¼ 4.538; SDDPTG¼ 1.195;
n¼ 144 for the low suffering condition and
MDPTG¼ 4.981; SDDPTG¼ 0.978; n¼ 138 for the
high suffering condition).
Deliberative rumination. The deliberative rumina-
tion subdomain of the Event Related Rumination
Inventory (Cann et al., 2011) from Study 2 was
adapted to refer to participants personally and reflect
predictions in the weeks immediately after the acci-
dent (e.g. “I would think about whether I can find
meaning from the accident”). Participants responded
on a 4-point scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 4 (“often”).
These items demonstrated good internal reliability
(a¼ 0.915), so were averaged to create an overall
score of rumination (MRUM¼ 1.943;
SDRUM¼ 0.667; n¼ 144 for the low suffering condi-
tion and MRUM¼ 2.829; SDRUM¼ 0.558; n¼ 138 for
the high suffering condition).
Manipulation and attention check. We used the
same three items from Studies 2 and 3A to measure
suffering and unfairness. However, in this study, we
adjusted the phrasing of the questions to refer to the
participants personally (e.g. “In your opinion, how
much do you believe you would have suffered from
this accident?”). These items demonstrated good
internal reliability (a¼ 0.722), so were averaged to
create an overall score of perceived unfairness
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(MPU¼ 3.167; SDPU¼ 1.073; n¼ 144 for the low suf-
fering condition and MPU¼ 5.181; SDPU¼ 1.037;
n¼ 138 for the high suffering condition).
We used the same attention check question from
Studies 1 and 2, in which participants had to identify
the injuries they previously imagined they had suf-
fered in the scenario they read (i.e. broken leg and
spinal damage/mild sprain to the ankle/no injuries/
can’t remember). As outlined in the participant sec-
tion, 19 participants failed this attention check ques-
tion and were excluded from data analysis. Finally, as
in Study 3A, participants answered one question on
how easy they found it to imagine the accident had
happened in their life on a scale from 1 (“not at all
easy”) to 5 (“very easy”) and provided their age and
gender.
Procedure. Participants responded to an advertisement
posted on Prolific to participate in an online survey
about perceptions of people and personal experiences.
The survey was conducted via Qualtrics. Participants
were presented with a participant information sheet
and provided informed consent before participating
in the study.
Participants first responded to the BUJ scale
(Maes, 1998) before reading a vignette. The vignette
asked participants to imagine the scenario they read
had happened to themselves and participants were
randomly allocated to either the high suffering or
the low suffering condition. Next, participants
responded to the adapted PTGI (Tedeschi &
Calhoun, 1996) to measure PPTG, followed by the
adapted deliberative rumination scale (Cann et al.,
2011) and deservingness of PTG measure. The pre-
sentation order of the rumination and deservingness
measures were counterbalanced, such that half of the
participants responded to the deservingness of PTG
items first and the other half of participants
responded to the deliberative rumination items first.
Participants then answered the manipulation check
and attention check questions, followed by demo-
graphic questions about their age and gender.
Participants were debriefed and paid £2 for their
participation.
Results
Manipulation check: Perceived unfairness. No outliers
(extreme values 3 SD from the mean in each condi-
tion) were detected for the variable of perceived
unfairness. The data were skewed in both the low
suffering condition (W(144)¼ 0.97, p¼ 0.003) and
the high suffering condition (W(138)¼ 0.97,
p¼ 0.002), therefore a nonparametric test was con-
ducted. A Mann–Whitney test validated our manipu-
lation by demonstrating that participants in the high
suffering condition (Mdn¼ 5.00, SD¼ 1.04, Mean
ranks¼ 200.58) perceived their imagined accident as
significantly more unfair than participants in the low
suffering condition (Mdn¼ 3.33, SD¼ 1.07, Mean
ranks¼ 84.89), U¼ 1783.50, Z¼11.944, p< 0.001,
ƞ2¼ 0.51.
Predicted post-traumatic growth. No outliers (extreme
values 3 SD from the mean in each condition)
were detected for the variable of PPTG. However,
this variable was positively skewed in the low suffer-
ing condition (W(144)¼ 0.91, p< 0.001) and Levene’s
test for equality of variances was significant, F(1,
280)¼ 3.948, p¼ 0.048. For these reasons, a nonpara-
metric test was conducted. A Mann–Whitney test
demonstrated that participants in the high suffering
condition (Mdn¼ 3.76, SD¼ 0.98, Mean
ranks¼ 186.58) predicted greater PTG for themselves
after reading the imagined accident than participants
in the low suffering condition (Mdn¼ 2.00,
SD¼ 1.09, Mean ranks¼ 98.30), U¼ 3715,
Z¼9.088, p< 0.001, ƞ2¼ 0.29.
Mediation analysis. First, we assessed the ease of
imagining the scenario as a possible covariate. As in
Study 3A, most participants found the accidents
described in the hypothetical scenarios fairly easy to
imagine happening to them with 76% of the sample
endorsing a “4” or “5” on the scale (Mean¼ 4.09,
SD¼ 0.98, Mode¼ 5.00). The ease of imagining vari-
able was significantly correlated with PTG and delib-
erative rumination (p< 0.007), but the correlations
were small (r<0.175). Therefore, as per the pre-
registration, ease of imagining was not included in
any of the following analysis as a covariate.
Before examining whether perceived deservingness
of PTG and the likelihood of engaging in intentional
meaning making (i.e. deliberative rumination) medi-
ated the relationship between condition and PPTG,
we examined whether the data met the assumptions
required for regression. No issues with normality (as
assessed by examining the plot of residuals), hetero-
scedasticity or multicollinearity were identified
(Tolerance< 1, IVF< 2). We examined the data for
outliers using Mahalanobis distance, cooks distance
and leverage statistics and utilized a conservative
strategy where participants were excluded only if
they exceeded the cut-off score for two of the outlier
statistics, which was the case for five participants.
We conducted mediation analyses using the
PROCESS macro via SPSS (Hayes, 2017; Model 4,
10,000 resamples). We regressed condition (X),
deservingness of PTG (M1), and rumination (M2)
onto PPTG (Y). The indirect pathway between suf-
fering condition and PPTG, via perceived deserving-
ness of PTG, was significant (indirect effect, b¼ 0.19,
95% BCa CI [0.10, 0.29]) and the indirect pathway
between suffering condition and PPTG, via delibera-
tive rumination, was also significant (indirect effect, b
¼ 0.60, 95% BCa CI [0.42, 0.79]; see Figure 4).
A pairwise contrast between the two mediators sig-
nificantly differed from 0 (indirect effect, b¼0.41,
95% BCa CI [0.62, 0.20]), suggesting the indirect
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pathways for each mediator differed in strength from
one another. In other words, deliberative rumination
was a stronger mediator than perceived deservingness
of PTG when mediating the effect of suffering condi-
tion on the predictive PPTG.
Moderated mediation analysis. Before examining
whether BUJ moderated the mediation of perceived
deservingness of PTG on the relationship between
condition and PPTG, we examined whether the data
met the assumptions required for moderated media-
tion. No issues with normality (as assessed by exam-
ining the plot of residuals), heteroscedasticity or
multicollinearity were identified (Tolerance< 1,
IVF< 2). No outliers were identified via the
Mahalanobis distance statistics. We conducted mod-
erated mediation analyses using the PROCESS macro
via SPSS (Hayes, 2017; Model 7, 10,000 resamples).
We regressed condition (X) and deservingness of PTG
(M), onto PPTG (Y) with BUJ as the moderator (W).
The moderated regression analyses determined there
was no significant interaction between BUJ and the
relationship between suffering condition and per-
ceived deservingness of PTG (b¼ 0.09, SE¼ 0.11),
t(278)¼ 0.78, p¼ 0.434, 95% BCa CI [0.13, 0.30].
Discussion
The results from Study 3B conceptually replicate
those from Study 2 and demonstrate that participants
predict PTG comparably for another as they do for
themselves. When participants imagine themselves
suffering trauma, compared to a mild inconvenience,
they predict themselves experiencing greater future
positive psychological growth. Participants responded
to imagined trauma partly as a way to cope with the
trauma and consider themselves deserving of PTG,
and partly because they expected that they would
contemplate and deliberate their trauma to grow
from it. We found no support for individual differ-
ences in BUJ moderating this effect.
The analyses in Study 3B also illustrated that the
expectation of deliberative rumination accounted for
more variance than perceived deservingness of PTG
in the relationship between suffering condition and
PPTG. In other words, people who imagined great
suffering predicted that they would grow from the
experience, primarily because they would find mean-
ing from the experience, and, to a lesser extent,
because they feel deserving of such growth.
Interestingly, this differentiation between mediators
was not observed in Study 2 and therefore the weight-
ing and contribution of these two mechanisms in
accounting for expectations of PTG may differ
depending on whether one is predicting PTG for
themselves or an other.
The combined findings of Studies 2 and 3B provide
support for expectations of growth, measured via an
adapted version of the PTGI, reflecting both a coping
mechanism and a cognitive mechanism outlined in
PTG theory.
Study 4
Study 3B had two limitations: (1) participants were
imagining hypothetical events happening to them-
selves and (2) participants were predicting how
much they expected to ruminate on the event and
experience PTG from it. These limitations are prob-
lematic because we cannot be confident that percep-
tions of deservingness and deliberative rumination
mediate the relationship between suffering and PTG
when participants reflect on their own real and past
events. As such, in Study 4, we propose to ask par-
ticipants to reflect on a recent episode of suffering
(high threat) or mild frustration (low threat) to
mirror high and low suffering conditions from
Studies 1–3. Afterwards, participants will respond to
Figure 4. Mediational model from Study 3B, predicting perceived post-traumatic growth from suffering condition, perceived
deservingness of post-traumatic growth and deliberative rumination, when participants imagined their own suffering.
Values show unstandardized path coefficients, ***p< 0.001. The indirect effect is not associated with a p-value (see Hayes, 2017).
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questions that measure their perceptions of their
deservingness of PTG, engagement in meaning
making and PTG.
If participants’ hypothetical predictions of PTG
from Study 3B are accurate forecasts, we expect to
conceptually replicate these prior findings in Study 4.
That is, participants who reflect on a recent highly
distressing event (i.e. the high suffering condition)
will perceive greater PTG for themselves compared
to participants who recalled a mildly distressing
event (i.e. low suffering condition), with both per-
ceived deservingness of PTG and deliberative rumina-
tion mediating this relationship. Our hypotheses and
data analysis plan were preregistered prior to data
collection and are available from the Open Science
Framework project page https://osf.io/dwa3s/
(Blackie & Harvey, 2020d).
Methods
Participants. A total of 317 participants from the UK
were recruited online via Prolific, in return for pay-
ment of £1.60. Our sample size was determined from
power calculations for parallel mediation using the
power estimator tool from Schoemann et al. (2017),
utilizing correlations between variables from Study
3B. These estimates returned a sample size of 200
participants to detect effects with 80% power. We
increased our proposed sample size to 300 partici-
pants to try and ensure we maintain 200 participants
after our planned data exclusions. Full details of our
power calculation can be found on our project page
on the Open Science Framework.
Participants who had participated in Study 1, 2,
3A, or 3B were prevented from participating in this
study to ensure participants were blind to hypotheses.
A total of 40 participants were excluded from data
analysis based on criteria in our preregistered data
analytic plan for (1) not consenting to the study
(n¼ 4), (2) failing the attention check question
(n¼ 21), (3) consenting to the survey, but then not
answering a single item (n¼ 14) or (4) not typing
something related to the instructions for the recalled
event manipulation (n¼ 1). A final sample consisted
of 277 participants (69.3% female, 30% male, 0.7%
nonbinary; aged 18–70 years Mage¼ 34.96 years;
SDage¼ 12.39). The study received ethical approval
from the School Research Ethics Committee at the
second author’s university.
Materials. Vignette: Suffering manipulation.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the
low suffering or the high suffering condition. In
both conditions, we asked participants to recall a neg-
ative event that they had personally experienced. We
asked for the event to have taken place between 3
June 2020 and 5 November 2020, which represented
a time window of the last six months, but not the
most recent four weeks, from the survey date. We
wanted to specify the time window of the recalled
event to ensure that the temporal component
remained constant in both conditions and did not
influence findings, especially as research has found
differences in the recall of autobiographical memories
when recent and remote emotional events were com-
pared (Wardell et al., 2020). In the high suffering con-
dition, participants were instructed to recall an event
that was “very distressing and upsetting”. In the low
suffering condition, participants were asked to recall
an event that was “mildly unpleasant, stressful or
frustrating, but one where the negativity or irritation
was short lived”. In both conditions, participants
were asked to describe the nature of the event, but
not include any names or places, in five words or less.
Post-traumatic growth. We used the PTGI
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996) to ask participants to
rate the extent to which they experienced positive
changes in their relationships/spirituality/personal
strength/possibilities for life/appreciation of life as a
result of the recalled event. Participants rated the
items on a six-point scale (from 1¼ “I have not expe-
rienced this change as a result of this negative event”
to 6¼ “I have experienced this change to a very great
degree as a result of this negative event”). These items
demonstrated good internal reliability (a¼ .952), so
were averaged to create an overall score of PTG
(MPTG¼ 2.672; SDPTG¼ 1.218; n¼ 140 for the low
suffering condition and MPTG¼ 3.094;
SDPTG¼ 1.105; n¼ 137 for the high suffering
condition).
Deservingness of PTG. The same five deservingness
items from Study 3B were utilized to measure deserv-
ingness of PTG, but the future tense was removed
(e.g. “I deserve to develop stronger relationships
with others”). These items demonstrated good inter-
nal reliability (a¼ 0.817), so were averaged to create
an overall score of deservingness of PTG
(MDPTG¼ 4.996; SDDPTG¼ 1.071; n¼ 140 for the
low suffering condition and MDPTG¼ 5.311;
SDDPTG¼ 0.963; n¼ 137 for the high suffering
condition).
Deliberative rumination. The deliberative rumina-
tion subdomain of the Event-Related Rumination
Inventory (Cann et al., 2011) was utilized to measure
how much time participants had deliberatively spent
thinking about the event they recalled in the weeks
immediately after it had occurred (e.g. “I thought
about whether I could find meaning from the
event”). Participants responded on a 4-point scale
from 1 (“not at all”) to 4 (“often”). These items dem-
onstrated good internal reliability (a¼ 0.874), so were
averaged to create an overall score of rumination
(MRUM¼ 2.342; SDRUM¼ 0.786; n¼ 140 for the low
suffering condition and MRUM¼ 2.674;
SDRUM¼ 0.590; n¼ 137 for the high suffering
condition).
Manipulation and attention check. We used the
same three items from Study 3B to measure suffering
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and unfairness, although the items were adjusted to
refer to the past tense, rather than the future (e.g. “In
your opinion, how much do you believe you suffered
from this event?”). These items demonstrated accept-
able internal reliability (a¼ 0.624),4 so were averaged
to create an overall score of perceived unfairness
(MPU¼ 4.152; SDPU¼ 1.406; n¼ 140 for the low suf-
fering condition and MPU¼ 4.874; SDPU¼ 1.380;
n¼ 137 for the high suffering condition).
As an attention check measure, we asked partici-
pants whether the negative event they recalled had
occurred between 3 June 2020 and 5 November
2020. Participants answered “No”, “Yes” or “I can’t
remember”. As outlined in the participant section, 21
participants failed this attention check question (i.e.
answered “No” or “I can’t remember”) and were
excluded from data analysis.
Procedure. Participants responded to an advertisement
posted on Prolific to participate in an online survey
about perceptions of people and personal experiences.
The survey was conducted via Qualtrics. Participants
were presented with a participant information sheet
and provided informed consent before participating
in the study.
Participants were randomly allocated to either the
high suffering or the low suffering condition and
asked to recall either a highly distressing and upset-
ting or mildly unpleasant/stressful/frustrating event
respectively. Next, participants responded to the
PTGI (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996) to measure PTG,
followed by the deliberative rumination scale (Cann
et al., 2011) and deservingness of PTG measure. The
presentation order of the rumination and deserving-
ness measures were counterbalanced, such that half of
the participants responded to the deservingness of
PTG items first and the other half of participants
responded to the deliberative rumination items first.
Participants then answered the manipulation check
and attention check questions, followed by demo-
graphic questions about their age and gender.
Participants were debriefed and paid £1.60 for their
participation.
Results
The data, correlation matrices, and syntax files are
available from the project page on the Open Science
Framework.
Manipulation check: Perceived unfairness. No outliers
(extreme values 3 SD from the mean in each condi-
tion) were detected for the variable of perceived
unfairness. The data was skewed in both the low suf-
fering condition (W(140)¼ 0.98, p¼ 0.045) and the
high suffering condition (W(137)¼ 0.97, p¼ 0.001),
therefore a nonparametric test was conducted.
A Mann–Whitney test validated our manipulation
by demonstrating that participants in the high
suffering condition (Mdn¼ 5.00, SD¼ 1.38, Mean
ranks¼ 158.61) perceived their recalled event as sig-
nificantly more unfair than participants in the low
suffering condition (Mdn¼ 4, SD¼ 1.41, Mean
ranks¼ 116.81), U¼ 6903.50, Z¼4.04, p< 0.001,
ƞ2¼ 0.06.
Post-traumatic growth. No outliers (extreme values 3
SD from the mean in each condition) were detected
for the variable of PTG. However, the data were
skewed in both the low suffering condition (W
(140)¼ 0.95, p< 0.001) and the high suffering condi-
tion (W(137)¼ 0.98, p¼ 0.019), therefore a nonpara-
metric test was conducted. A Mann–Whitney
demonstrated that participants in the high suffering
condition (Mdn¼ 3.00, SD¼ 1.11, Mean
ranks¼ 154.69) perceived greater PTG than partici-
pants in the low suffering condition (Mdn¼ 2.48,
SD¼ 1.22, Mean ranks¼ 123.65), U¼ 7440.50,
Z¼3.23, p¼ 0.001, ƞ2¼ 0.04.
Mediation analysis. Before examining whether per-
ceived deservingness of PTG and the likelihood of
engaging in intentional meaning making (i.e. deliber-
ative rumination) mediated the relationship between
condition and PTG, we examined whether the data
met the assumptions required for regression. No
issues with normality (as assessed by examining the
plot of residuals), heteroscedasticity or multicollinear-
ity were identified (Tolerance< 1, IVF< 2). We
examined the data for outliers using Mahalanobis dis-
tance, cooks distance, and leverage statistics and uti-
lized a conservative strategy where participants were
excluded only if they exceeded the cut-off score for
two of the outlier statistics, which was the case for
two participants.
We conducted mediation analyses using the
PROCESS macro via SPSS (Hayes, 2017; Model 4,
10,000 resamples). We regressed condition (X),
deservingness of PTG (M1), and rumination (M2)
onto PTG (Y). The indirect pathway between suffer-
ing condition and PTG, via perceived deservingness
of PTG, was significant (indirect effect, b¼ 0.09, 95%
BCa CI [0.01, 0.17]) and the indirect pathway
between suffering condition and PTG, via delibera-
tive rumination, was also significant (indirect effect,
b ¼ 0.26, 95% BCa CI [0.12, 0.41]; see Figure 5).
A pairwise contrast between the two mediators sig-
nificantly differed from 0 (indirect effect, b¼0.17,
95% BCa CI [0.32, 0.04]), suggesting the indirect
pathways for each mediator differed in strength from
one another. In other words, deliberative rumination
was a stronger mediator than perceived deservingness
of PTG when mediating the effect of suffering condi-
tion on PTG.
Discussion
The results from Study 4 conceptually replicate those
from Study 3B and demonstrate that participants’
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motivations for reporting PTG are comparable to
when they make hypothetical predictions about how
much PTG they are likely to experience. When par-
ticipants consider their recent distressing negative
events, compared to a mild inconvenience, they
report greater positive psychological growth.
Participants report growing from a recent distressing
negative event partly as a way to cope with the
trauma by considering themselves deserving of
PTG, and partly because they have contemplated
and deliberated their trauma and how to grow from
it. As in Study 3B, we found that deliberative rumi-
nation accounted for more variance than perceived
deservingness of PTG in the relationship between suf-
fering condition and PTG. That is, people who
recalled an event of great suffering reported they
grew from the experience, primarily because they
found meaning from such an experience, and, to a
lesser extent, because they felt deserving of growth.
General discussion
The aim of this paper was to investigate whether per-
ceptions of PTG, via the PTGI (Tedeschi & Calhoun,
1996), were motivated by an attempt to cope with
instances of injustice that threaten one’s BJW
(Lerner, 1980). We examined this hypothesis utilizing
both hypothetical scenarios and predictions of future
positive psychological growth (i.e. PPTG) on an
adapted version of the PTGI (Studies 1–3B), and as
self-reported PTG on the original PTGI in reference
to a distressing event that had occurred in partici-
pants’ lives (Study 4). This research was based on
findings from prospective longitudinal studies that
have observed small to no correlations between par-
ticipants’ perceptions of PTG on the PTGI and pre-
to post-trauma change in PTG (Boals et al., 2019;
Frazier et al., 2009; Owenz & Fowers, 2018; Yanez
et al., 2011), which have called into question the suit-
ability of the cross-sectional and retrospective PTGI
for measuring PTG in terms of positive personality
change. If the PTGI is not reliably measuring the
construct of PTG, as it was originally theorized,
then questions remain about what is measured by
the PTGI.
Overview of methodological approach and results
In four studies, we examined the extent to which
responses on the PTGI were motivated by the
coping mechanism of UJR, which is the belief that
instances of undeserved suffering are ultimately com-
pensated in the long run with positivity to restore
one’s BJW (Harvey & Callan, 2014a; Lerner, 1980).
We conceptualized UJR here by measuring how
deserving participants felt of PTG as a result of
their suffering. In Studies 2–4, we also considered
whether deliberative rumination, a PTG mechanism,
accounts for responses on the PTGI. That is, once
someone’s assumptions about the world are shat-
tered, they need to rebuild their framework and
core beliefs about the world by engaging in delibera-
tive ruminative thought (Cann et al., 2011).
There are notable differences in the methodologies
used by researchers examining just world theory and
researchers examining PTG. The two research areas
originate from different traditions, with research into
BJW derived from experimental social psychology
(see Hafer & Begue, 2005, for a review) and research
into PTG derived from clinical psychology (see
Infurna & Jayawickreme, 2019, for a review). In this
paper we utilized methodologies from both research
traditions. Specifically, Studies 1 to 3B employed
experimental designs that utilized hypothetical sce-
narios, which required participants to predict the like-
lihood of experiencing PTG as an outcome in the
Figure 5. Mediational model from Study 4, predicting perceived post-traumatic growth from suffering condition, perceived
deservingness of post-traumatic growth and deliberative rumination, when participants considered their own suffering.
Values show unstandardized path coefficients, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. The indirect effect is not associated with a p value
(see Hayes, 2017).
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future, both for others (Studies 1 and 2) and them-
selves (Study 3). However, Study 4 employed a design
similar to traditional PTG studies, insofar as partic-
ipants recalled a distressing event from their own lives
and self-reported the extent to which they had expe-
rienced PTG. Study 4 was an important addition to
this paper, because it extended our findings from
hypothetical responses to examine if perceptions of
deservingness and deliberative rumination also medi-
ated the relationship between suffering and PTG
when participants reflect on their own experiences.
Yet, Study 4 also had a comparable control condition
(i.e. recall of a mildly unpleasant/stressful/frustrating
event), which is often lacking in PTG studies
(Jayawickreme & Blackie, 2014).
In Studies 1 through 3B, where perceptions of PTG
were predicted after participants imagined hypotheti-
cal scenarios, we observed that participants predicted
greater PTG in response to a severe accident that
caused grave suffering (versus a minor incident),
both for another individual and for themselves. We
further found that perceptions of deservingness of
PTG and predictions of engagement in deliberative
meaning making mediated the relationship between
suffering and predictions of PTG in Studies 2, 3A,
and 3B. In Study 4, we replicated these results when
participants recalled a distressing (versus a mildly
unpleasant event) from the last six months within
their own lives and reported the PTG they had expe-
rienced, the extent to which they had engaged in
deliberative meaning making and felt deserving of
PTG. Thus, across four studies, we found that partic-
ipants both predicted and reported experiencing PTG
as a function of both UJR (i.e. deservingness) and
PTG (i.e. deliberative meaning-making) mechanisms,
with the latter observed as the strongest mechanism
when participants considered their own PTG.
What motivates individuals’ self-reports of PTG
(via the PTGI)?
Our results provide support for the hypothesis that
perceptions of PTG, via the PTGI, are motivated by
efforts to restore BJW, but importantly, Studies 2, 3B,
and 4 also found support for the role of a PTG-
related mechanism of deliberative rumination (Cann
et al., 2011). These two mechanisms operated in par-
allel, yet in Studies 3B and 4 where participants con-
sidered their own suffering, deliberative rumination
was the stronger of the two mechanisms for predicting
PTG. Thus, overall, our results cannot be entirely
explained within the context of just world theory
(Lerner, 1980). Instead, our findings demonstrate
that participants’ responses to the PTGI do not mea-
sure one consistent psychological construct.
Participants’ perceptions were motivated by a
coping response to restore a sense of justice, but
also through the level of engagement in self-
reflection on the impact and meaning of the tragedy.
Although our results do not conclusively demon-
strate that the PTGI tool (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996)
is solely capturing a coping strategy utilized by indi-
viduals to manage the impact of perceived injustices,
our findings speak to the challenges surrounding the
study of PTG. Specifically, our results confirm some
researchers’ concerns about the ambiguity of what
perceptions of PTG actually measure (Coyne &
Tennen, 2010), as our findings illustrate that percep-
tions of PTG can reflect distinct and often competing
motivational mechanisms. Taken together with
research showing that perceptions of PTG are
weakly correlated with actual changes in PTG over
time (Boals et al., 2019; Frazier et al., 2009; Owenz &
Fowers, 2018; Yanez et al., 2011), our findings sug-
gest that the PTGI is not a pure measure of PTG, in
terms of positive personality change.
Constraints on when PTG is perceived as deserved
It is important to note that we did not observe deserv-
ingness of PTG as mediating the relationship between
condition and predictions of PTG in Study 1
(although it was found in Studies 2, 3B, and 4). The
main difference between the design of Study 1 and the
other experiments was that our first study assessed
UJR through two methods—via UJR items used in
previous just world research and via the adapted
PTGI (i.e. PPTG). Our measure of PPTG and our
UJR items were similar in that they asked partici-
pants to predict the likelihood of future positivity in
life for a target character. The UJR items reflected
predictions of a future meaningful and fulfilling life,
and the PPTG measured future positive changes in
five domains (relationships, spirituality, personal
strength, possibilities for life, and appreciation of
life). It is possible that because participants had
responded to the PPTG items, the UJR items and
the deservingness of UJR items, the threat posed to
their BJW after reading about the high suffering
victim was annulled, and further engagement in the
deservingness of PTG items was redundant. That is,
participants perceived that the high suffering victim
was deserving of a fulfilling and meaningful life, and
engaging in this form of UJR was in itself sufficient to
compensate for the trauma endured. This logic fol-
lows research from motivated social cognition that
reaching an end state, in this case annulling the
threat to one’s BJW, leads to a reduction in processes
that serve to achieve this end-state (i.e. further restor-
ative reactions to injustice; see Kruglanski et al.,
2002).
Indeed, related research considering a different
reaction to injustice, immanent justice reasoning
(IJR), provides support for this explanation (Callan
et al., 2014). IJR is the belief that actions result in
deserved outcomes, even when there is no physically
plausible or causal mechanism between action and
outcome (Callan et al., 2014; Piaget, 1965). Callan
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et al. (2014) found that participants engage in IJR to
a lesser extent when a victim has already received
their “just deserts” and justice had been restored via
a form of IJR (i.e. a thief that is then a victim of theft)
compared to when they have not received such a fate.
The contrast in findings from Study 1 and our follow-
ing studies, therefore, suggests that our measure of
PPTG reflects a form of UJR, which is only perceived
as deserved when a threat to one’s BJW is still
present.
Limitations and future directions
Although our findings offer potentially promising
new avenues for researchers to explore when examin-
ing what motivates (or underlies) people’s reports of
PTG, there are some limitations that future research
would need to address. First, our hypothesized
temporal order of the psychological processes as
tested in our mediation models was derived from rel-
evant theory on BJW (Lerner, 1980) and PTG
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004), yet measurement of
the outcome (i.e. PTG) preceded measurement of
the mediators (i.e. deservingness of future PTG and
deliberative rumination). Although inconsistent with
theory on PTG and BJW, people may perceive PTG
and then engage in intentional meaning making and
post-event rationalizations about their deservingness
of PTG. The reverse causality of this alternative
hypothesis cannot be ruled out in these studies,
not only due to the temporal order in which we col-
lected the variables, but also because in experimental
study designs where the mediator and outcome
are measured at the same one point in time, the
temporal precedence of the hypothesized mediator is
not sufficient to conclude causality (Gelfand et al.,
2009).
In measurement-mediation models, such as the
ones in the current paper, Pirlott and MacKinnon
(2016) have argued that temporal precedent of the
mediator cannot be established, and nor can con-
founding variables that account for the relationship
between the mediator and outcome be ruled out.
Following Pirlott and MacKinnon’s (2016)
recommendations, researchers could employ a
manipulation-of-mediator design in future studies.
In this design, an enhancement manipulation could
be used to encourage people to engage in greater
meaning making processes or perceptions of deserv-
ingness and then examine whether this manipulation
strengthens the relationship between the occurrence
of a highly threatening event and perceptions of
PTG. The designs of Studies 1, 2, and 3B could be
adapted to apply this design as they utilized hypothet-
ical events, but researchers would need to carefully
consider the ethical issues of utilizing this design in
response to people’s own negative experiences. There
are at least two main ethical issues to consider in this
case: (1) the manipulation or enhancement of the
mediator could directly or indirectly encourage
people to not find meaning or feel less deserving of
PTG, and (2) it could be harmful to encourage people
to actively engage in greater meaning making or per-
ceptions of deservingness when researchers do not
know the value of such processes over time. If such
processes are associated with increases in distress over
time, as some researchers have found with percep-
tions of PTG (Frazier et al., 2009), then this design
should not be implemented. As we note in due course,
the temporal dynamics of these two processes—per-
ceptions of deservingness and deliberative rumina-
tion—need further investigation, and therefore
longitudinal measurement-mediator designs in which
auto-regressive effects can be modeled might be the
better solution for these methodological concerns
when examining individuals’ own negative experien-
ces until the utility of these processes on well-being is
known.
A second limitation is that we restricted investiga-
tion of negative experiences in Study 4 to those that
occurred within individuals’ lives in the past six
months. We did this because BJW strategies, such
as UJR, are typically theorized as defence reactions
to emotionally involving events and reactions are
measured in experiments shortly after exposure to
stimuli (see Hafer & Begue, 2005). However, by
asking participants to recall recent experiences, we
may have limited the range and type of events rele-
vant for PTG and it is unlikely that participants in
the high threat condition had all experienced a form
of clinical trauma in this short time frame. Although
Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) use the term trauma
more broadly than the clinical diagnosis of trauma,
they argue that the negative experiences that facili-
tate PTG should be seismic enough to challenge
individuals’ worldviews. The wording used in Study
4 to manipulate event severity was designed with this
in mind, but future research should strive to examine
how the two processes of perceptions of deserving-
ness and deliberative rumination relate to percep-
tions of PTG in response to a broader range of
challenging and traumatic experiences. We note
however, that our analyses confirmed that, on aver-
age, individuals in the high threat condition recalled
events that they perceived as more severe and unfair
when compared to participants in the low threat
group (i.e. consistent with our manipulation
instructions).
Finally, future research should involve the identi-
fication of individual differences that may make
engagement in UJR more likely to occur. Assuming
that UJR is a coping mechanism that individuals use,
at least in part, when responding to the PTGI about
their own traumatic experiences, then it is important
to investigate who is most likely to use this mecha-
nism to cope with adversity. People who score highly
on the BUJ individual difference measure subscribe to
believing that justice will ultimately be obtained in the
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long run (Maes, 1998). Maes (1998) found that people
who score highly on the BUJ scale, are also more
likely to find meaning in unfortunate events and
react to suffering with optimism. We were therefore
expecting this individual difference to moderate the
relationship between suffering condition and
perceptions of deserving PTG. However, in Study
3B we found no evidence for BUJ moderating the
effect of suffering condition on participants’ PPTG
following the exposure of participants to an imagined
accident.
Alternatively, research within the BJW literature
provides evidence for other individual difference
measures that influence the extent of UJR, such as
religiosity (Harvey & Callan, 2014b) and self-esteem
(Harvey & Callan, 2014a). Firstly, Harvey and Callan
(2014b) found that people who self-report as highly
religious, are more likely to believe a victim will have
a later fulfilling and meaningful life, regardless of
whether the victim was a bad (i.e. underserving) or
good (i.e. deserving) individual. Indeed, religious par-
ticipation is positively correlated with BUJ (Begue,
2002) and Maes and Schmitt (1999) claim UJR is
derived from religious doctrines that allude to injus-
tices being met by a higher form of justice. Secondly,
Harvey and Callan (2014a) found that the higher
one’s self-esteem, the more individuals perceive them-
selves as deserving and therefore likely to receive UJ.
Therefore, how positively individuals perceive them-
selves may influence how deserving one considers
themselves of PTG. Exploring multiple individual dif-
ference moderators was beyond the scope of this
study, but offers possible fruitful avenues for future
exploration.
Conclusion
In conclusion, our results suggest that self-reported
PTG after trauma (measured via both an adapted
version of the PTGI and the original PTGI) may be
underpinned by a motivated coping mechanism (i.e.
perceptions of deservingness), as well as engagement
in deliberative rumination. These mechanisms appear
to operate in parallel and explain perceptions of PTG
for both others and for the self, following trauma and
suffering. These findings echo concerns raised by
researchers previously about the ambiguity of what
perceptions of PTG via the PTGI actually measure
(Coyne & Tennen, 2010). Thus, as others have previ-
ously argued (Blackie & Jayawickreme, 2014), we
urge researchers to be clear and precise in their defi-
nitions and measurement of PTG, and further recom-
mend that researchers include measurement of
motivational mechanisms, where possible, especially
in studies where PTG is measured as perceptions of,
rather than actual, positive personality change.
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Notes
1. Personal information on participants (i.e. age and
gender) has been removed from the data files in line
with ethical approval procedures from the authors’
institutions.
2. This and all other mediation and moderation analyses
are not in the data syntax files, because analyses were run
using the custom dialog file via PROCESS.
3. We deviated from our preregistered data analysis plan
and created an averaged unfairness score despite
Cronbach’s alpha being slightly lower than the specified
0.70 threshold.
4. We deviated from our preregistered data analysis plan
and created an averaged unfairness score despite
Cronbach’s alpha being slightly lower than the specified
0.70 threshold.
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